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Is Objective Act Consequentialism Satisfiable?
Johan E. Gustafsson∗
Tuesday, 3 April 2018 at 10:20 p.m.
A compelling requirement on normative theories is that they should be
satisfiable, that is, in every possible choice situationwith a finite number
of alternatives, there should be at least one performable act such that,
if one were to perform that act, one would comply with the theory. In
this paper, I argue that, given some standard assumptions about free
will and counterfactuals, Objective Act Consequentialism violates this
requirement.
It is a compelling idea that, in any situation in which one might find
oneself, one can always comply withmorality. This is the basic idea behind
The Principle of Satisfiability
In every possible choice situation where the number of performable
acts is finite, there is at least one performable act such that, if it
were performed, it would not be wrong.1
Why should moral theories conform to this principle? One answer is that
normative theories should ideally guide one’s actions and one can’t be
guided by a theory if one cannot comply with it, or more precisely, there
is nothing one can do such that, if one were to do it, one would comply
with the theory (Bykvist, 2007, 117). In this paper, I shall argue that, given
some standard assumptions about free will and counterfactuals, Objective
Act Consequentialism violates the Principle of Satisfiability.
Before we go on, however, it might help to clarify the relation between
the Principle of Satisfiability andmoral dilemmas.Moral dilemmas are typ-
ically taken to be choice situations where each performable act would be
∗ I would be grateful for any thoughts or comments on this paper, which can be sent
to me at johan.eric.gustafsson@gmail.com.
1 Bykvist (2007, 116) puts forward a stronger proposal, more similar to the Principle
of Strong Satisfiability (see the end of this paper). Jackson and Pargetter (1986, 242) claim
that ‘surely no ethical theory should make it impossible for someone to do everything
he or she ought.’ See also Österberg 1988, 127 and Arrhenius 2000, 193. I have restricted
the Principle of Satisfiability to situations where the number of performable acts is
finite, because, in situations with infinitely many performable acts, it might be that the
outcome of each performable act is worse than the outcome of some other performable
act and then it’s arguably plausible that every performable act would be wrong if it were
performed; see Savage 1954, 18.
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wrong if it were performed (Vallentyne 1989, 301, Sinnott-Armstrong 1996,
49–50, and Zimmerman 1996, 207–8). Assuming a finite number of per-
formable acts, the Principle of Satisfiability rules out moral dilemmas in
this sense. These dilemmas should be distinguished from prohibition and
obligation dilemmas. Prohibition dilemmas are choice situations where
every performable act is wrong; obligation dilemmas are choice situations
where each of two incompatible, performable acts is obligatory (Vallen-
tyne, 1989, 302; 1992, 118). Assuming a finite number of performable acts,
these kinds of dilemmas are ruled out by the combination of the Principle
of Satisfiability and
The Principle of Strong Normative Invariance
If an act is performable in a choice situation, then its normative
status does not depend on which of the performable acts in the
situation are performed.2
On its own, however, the Principle of Satisfiability does not rule out pro-
hibition or obligation dilemmas. If the Principle of Strong Normative
Invariance doesn’t hold, there might be prohibition dilemmas where each
performable act is wrong but at least one of these acts wouldn’t be wrong
if it were performed; and, similarly, there might be obligation dilemmas
where there are two incompatible, performable acts each of which is
obligatory but at least one of which wouldn’t be obligatory if the other
act were performed. Hence there might be prohibition and obligation
dilemmas that are not moral dilemmas.3 Nevertheless, prohibition and
obligation dilemmas, as well as violations of the Principle of Strong Nor-
mative Invariance, need not be very worrying as long as the Principle of
Satisfiability holds, because, if that principle holds, one might still be able
to comply with morality.
According to
2 Carlson 1995, 101. Prichard (1932, 26) proposes a similar idea but is mainly con-
cerned with whether being obligatory is a property of the act; a property that depends
on the existence of the act.
3 If normative variance is possible, then there might be prohibition and obligation
dilemmas that are not moral dilemmas and, moreover, Vallentyne’s taxonomy of moral
dilemmas should be expanded with a further kind of moral dilemma: Let a variance
dilemma be a choice situation where (i) there is at least one performable act that is not
wrong, (ii) there are not two or more incompatible, performable acts each of which is
obligatory, but (iii) each performable act would be wrong if it were performed.
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Act Consequentialism
An act x is right in a choice situation if and only if the outcome
of x is not worse than the outcome of any alternative act that is
performable in the situation. An act is wrong if and only if it is not
right.4
And, according to Objective Act Consequentialism, the morally relevant
outcome of an act is, roughly, what would happen if the act were per-
formed.5 This addition is motivated by the basic tenet of Consequential-
ism: that morality is about making the world as good as possible (Parfit
1984, 24 and Carlson 1995, 56). This rough account of outcomes can be
spelled out in a number of ways—for example:
The Principle of World Outcomes
The outcome of an act is the possible world that would be actual if
the act were performed.6
The Principle of Future-State Outcomes
The outcome of an act is the total future state of the possible world
that would obtain if the act were performed.7
For our discussion, the crucial feature of these principles is that they
both take the outcome of an act to be something that would be actual (or
the case) if the act were performed. Regarding subjunctive conditionals
of this kind, we shall adopt the standard view that, if there is a closest
(accessible) possible world where an act is performed and something is
the case in that world, then it would be the case if the act were performed
(Stalnaker 1968, 102 and Lewis 1973, 16). Moreover, we shall assume that
one is sometimes able to act otherwise than one in fact does, and that, if
one would have acted otherwise, some features about the choice situation
up until one made one’s choice would have been different. Perhaps some
true historical proposition would have been false or some law of nature
would have been broken. This follows from, for example, so determinism:
the claim that determinism is true but agents are sometimes able to act
4 Moore 1912, 31. Following Moore (1912, 16–17), we require that an act has to be
within the agent’s present voluntary control to be a performable alternative.
5 In Jackson and Pargetter’s (1986, 233) terms, we assume actualism rather than
possibilism. The argument of this paper should also apply, changing what needs to be
changed, to possibilist versions of Objective Act Consequentialism.
6 Carlson 1995, 10. For similar accounts, see Moore 1903, 147; 1912, 181; 1942, 558,
Feldman 1986, 36, Sosa 1993, 101, Tännsjö 1998, 31, and Portmore 2011, 34.
7 Carlson 1995, 10. Compare Bergström1966, 123–25. Carlson (1995, 56–57) argues that
any way of taking the morally relevant outcome of an act to be the causal consequences
of the act must, in order to be normatively plausible from the point of view of Objective
Act Consequentialism, be axiologically equivalent to the Principle of World Outcomes
or the Principle of Future-State Outcomes.
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otherwise. For instance, it might be that, if one had chosen otherwise,
then, just before one made one’s choice, one’s credences or desires would
have been slightly different.
Suppose that you are choosing between becoming an investment
banker and becoming a voluntary worker. Any future choices aer this
career choice are beyond your present voluntary control. As a matter of
fact, you will choose to become an investment banker, and this will make
you rich. But, because you are selfish, you won’t use your riches to do
much good in the world. You would do more good if you were to become
a voluntary worker instead. Accordingly, Objective Act Consequentialism
yields that becoming an investment banker is wrong, and, since you will
become one, it yields that, if you were to become an investment banker, it
would be wrong.8 Furthermore, suppose that the reason you will choose
to become an investment banker is that you are selfish.9And, in the closest
possible world where you instead choose to become a voluntary worker,
you are less selfish andmore altruistic.10 Suppose moreover that, from the
point of view of that world—that is, the closest possible world where you
become a voluntaryworker—the closest possible worldwhere you become
an investment banker isn’t the actual world but a world where you are
still altruistic.11 And, in that world where you are altruistic and become
an investment banker, you will do much more good with your riches than
you could do as a voluntary worker. So, if you were to become a voluntary
worker, it would be better to become an investment banker. Accordingly,
Objective Act Consequentialism yields that, if you were to become a
8 I assume the standard view that subjunctive conditionals with true components
are true; see Lewis 1973, 26–29, and compare Bennett 1974, 387–88; 2003, 239–50.
9 One might wonder whether this conflicts with your being able to become a vol-
untary worker. But, if we were to rule out that one sometimes can (in the same sense
as in the doctrine that ought implies can) do things which one is in fact unmotivated
to do, Objective Act Consequentialism would become too permissible. It’s implausible
that egoists can’t sometimes act wrongly by failing to do some self-denying act they are
selfishly motivated to avoid. See Parfit 1984, 14–15.
10 It might seem strange that someone could instantly change their motivation merely
bymaking a choice. The idea, however, is just that you would have beenmore altruistic if
you hadmade this choice. Your choice wouldn’t cause your altruism; rather, the direction
of causation would run in the opposite direction. See Lewis 1981, 117.
11 It’s not essential for the example that you would have had different desires if you
had chosen to become a voluntary worker. The example would work equally well if you
found it more credible that selfish people are happier if they choose to become voluntary
workers, as opposed to investment bankers. That is, you would believe, unlike in the
actual world, that even selfish people enjoy helping others. Then, we suppose that, from
the point of view of the closest world where you become a voluntary worker, the closest
world where you become an investment banker isn’t the actual world but a world where
you still believe that selfish people enjoy helping others but also that you would selfishly
enjoy effectively helping others by earning to give.
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voluntary worker, it would be wrong.12 Hence each performable act in
the situation (becoming an investment banker, becoming a voluntary
worker) would be wrong if it were performed.13
Now, consider a more general example with the same structure. Sup-
pose that you face a situation in which you can either perform act a or
perform act b. World w∗1 is the actual world, in which you perform a;
world w2 is the possible world where you perform b that is closest to w∗1 ;
and world w3 is the possible world where you perform a that is closest
to w2.14 Furthermore, the outcome of a in w∗1 is worse than the outcome
of b in w2, and the outcome of b in w2 is worse than the outcome of a
in w3. Given that you perform a, there are no further things under your
voluntary control in the situation which would affect any of the aspects
in which w∗1 and w3 differ.
world w∗1 w2 w3
choice a b a
value 1 2 3
The value of the outcome of a is 1 and the value of the outcome of b is 2.
Similarly, we have that, if you were to perform b, the value of the outcome
of b would still be 2 but the value of the outcome of a would be 3. In this
situation, performing a is wrong since it has a worse outcome than b.
But, if b were performed, b would be wrong since it would have a worse
outcome than a. So each performable act in this situation would be wrong
if it were performed. Objective Act Consequentialism thus violates the
Principle of Satisfiability.15
One might object that the outcome of a can’t be better in w3 than
in w∗1 , since this act is the same in both of these worlds. A central idea
in Objective Act Consequentialism, however, is that the outcome of an
act depends not just on the intrinsic properties of the act but also on how
the act would interact with the rest of the world if it were performed. So,
12 Here, we assume the Principle of Performability Invariance: whether an act is
performable in a choice situation does not depend on which of the performable acts in
the situation are performed. We shall consider liing this assumption later.
13 This example doesn’t trade on the much discussed problem that the outcome of
an act might depend on what other acts are also performed in the same situation; see
Goldman 1978, 188–89. That problem, unlike this one, can be blocked by the requirement
that the relevant alternatives should be incompatible in pairs; see Bergström 1966, 33–36.
14 In the actual choice situation, you are in w∗1 already (where you will perform a),
even though you can (but won’t) perform an act such that, if you were to perform it, you
would be (and would have been) in w2.
15 Moreover, in each situation we have considered, Objective Act Consequentialism
yields that there is a right act that wouldn’t be right if it were performed. Objective Act
Consequentialism thus violates the Principle of Strong Normative Invariance. These
situations are, according to Objective Act Consequentialism, neither prohibition nor
obligation dilemmas; they are variance dilemmas—see footnote 3.
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due to some difference between w∗1 and w3 which is extrinsic to a, this
act has different outcomes in these worlds. And the difference between
these outcomes is such that it makes one of them better than the other.
One might also object that my example makes some implausible
assumptions about the relative closeness of the involved possible worlds.
First, in w∗1 there is a unique closest world where b is performed, and
in w2 there is a unique closest world where a is performed. This follows
from counterfactual determinism: the claim that, for each performable act
in a situation, there is a unique closest possible world where that act is
performed.16 Without counterfactual determinism, some acts would lack
an outcome if we were to accept the Principle of World Outcomes. We
would then have to fall back on a more complicated account of outcomes,
for example, an account where the outcome of an act is the probability
distribution of states of affairs that would obtain if the act were performed.
Then, with that probabilistic account of outcomes, one could restate my
example without the assumption of counterfactual determinism.
Second, my example assumes that, if a is performed in the actual
world and w2 is the closest world where b is performed, then the actual
world needn’t be the world where a is performed which is closest to w2.
Yet this assumption is fairly minimal given, for example, so determinism.
On so determinism, if one were to act otherwise, either some law of
nature or some historical fact would be false. Then, on any plausible
measure of the closeness of possible worlds, we have that the worlds
where a is performed have at least some degree of remoteness from w2.
Furthermore, the worlds where a is performed might plausibly differ in
how much their historical facts and laws of nature depart from those
in w2. And then it seems that we can plausibly suppose that w∗1 and w3
differ in some of the respects that make possible worlds more or less
remote to w2 so that w2 is closer to w3 than to w∗1 .17 One way to resist
this upshot would be to rely on a closeness measure that favoured worlds
that are exactly like the actual world up until the agent’s choice except
for an instant minimal local miracle enabling the different choice. Since
everything else is fixed, a world where you choose one thing and the world
closest to it where you choose otherwise would then only differ, up to the
time of the choice, in what choice is made. So, on this proposal, the closest
world where a is performed, from the point of view of the closest world
where b is performed, would be the actual world. Hence my example
would be blocked. The trouble with this solution is that, if we keep your
16 See, for example, Goldman 1976, 452, Carlson 1995, 12, Tännsjö 1998, 41–43, and
Bykvist 2002, 40. The assumption of counterfactual determinism also shows that my
example doesn’t trade on the problem with underspecified counterfactuals discussed by
Vessel (2003).
17 Note also that w∗1 need not be closer to w3 than to w2.
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psychology fixed apart from your choosing otherwise, you wouldn’t be in
a coherent psychological state if you were to choose b. To see this, assume
that your psychology is coherent in the actual world and that, given your
credences and desires, you judge that you have most reason to perform a.
But then, if we favour holding your psychology fixed when we measure
closeness, the closest world where you perform b would be a world where
your credences and desires still support the judgement that you have most
reason to perform a, rather than b. It’s implausible to assess the option of
performing b by looking at a world where you choose b against your own
judgement and in conflict with your credences and desires. On the other
hand, closeness measures that likewise favours keeping other things fixed
up until the agent’s choice but which more strongly favour the agent’s
being psychological coherent wouldn’t block my example. They wouldn’t
do so, because the minimal psychological differences between the actual
world and the closest world w2 where you perform b can plausibly be
greater than the minimal psychological differences between w2 and a
world where you perform a.
One might moreover object that, if acts were individuated finely
enough, there couldn’t be a situationwhere the same act is performedwith
different outcomes in two possible worlds, which a is in my example.18
So, given a sufficiently fine-grained individuation of acts, my example
would be impossible. With a more fine-grained individuation, we could
replace a by the two more specific acts: a′—which is performed inw∗1 but
not in w3—and a′′—which is performed in w3 but not in w∗1 . Then a
′′
would be an act such that it wouldn’t be wrong if it were performed. But,
given this individuation, only a′ and b are performable in the situation
in w∗1 and only a
′′ and b are performable in the situation in w2.19 We
18 One could, for example, adopt Davidson’s (1969, 231) view that acts are events and
‘events are identical if and only if they have exactly the same causes and effects.’
19 Wlodek Rabinowicz proposes the following example, reported in Carlson 1995,
100n30, where the performability of an act depends on what is done, given a conditional
analysis of ability:
Suppose that Brown tries to li a 100 pound weight, and succeeds. Then
his action of liing a 100 pound weight (at that particular time) is per-
formable. But the nearest possible world where he does not li this weight
may well be a world where he wants and tries to li it, but fails. A typical
conditional analysis would then say that this action was not performable.
This example, however, is only an example of the performability of an act depending
on whether one succeeds in doing what one chooses to do. It’s not an example of the
performability of an act in a situation depending on what one chooses to do in that
situation. Bykvist (2002, 62) proposes an example where whether an act is an alternative
in a situation depends on what act is performed in that situation. But, in his example,
what one does in the situation doesn’t influence the performability of any act in that
situation; it only influences what acts count as alternatives in the situation. That is, it
doesn’t violate the Principle of Performability Invariance (see footnote 12)—it violates
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then have that a′, which will be performed, is wrong since it has a worse
outcome than b and, if b were performed, b would be wrong since it
would have a worse outcome than a′′. Hence, in the situation you face in
the actual world w∗1 , we still have that there is no performable act such
that it wouldn’t be wrong if it were performed.20
Finally, one might object that the Principle of Satisfiability is compati-
ble with Objective Act consequentialism if it is amended as follows:
The Amended Principle of Satisfiability
In every possible choice situation where the number of performable
acts is finite, there is at least one performable act such that, if it
were performed in that choice situation, it would not be wrong.
If we individuate choice situations by, among other things, the outcomes
of the performable acts, then Objective Act Consequentialism does not
violate this amended principle. Consider your choice between a and b. In
the actual world, where you perform a, the outcome of a is worse than
that of b. But, in the closest world where you perform b, the outcome of
your doing so is worse than that of a. So, in that world, the choice situation
in which you perform b isn’t the same as the one you face in the actual
world, because the outcomes of the performable acts are different. Hence
this example does not challenge the compatibility between Objective Act
Consequentialism and the amended principle.
But this amended principle is of limited interest. It fails to capture the
basic idea behind the Principle of Satisfiability: that, in any choice situa-
tion, there should be some performable act such that, if one performed it,
one would comply with morality. Even if Objective Act Consequentialism
satisfies the amended principle, you are still unable to comply with the
theory. While the amended principle ensures that there will be an act
such that it wouldn’t be wrong if it were performed in the situation you
face, the amended principle doesn’t ensure that you would comply with
Objective Act Consequentialism if you were to perform that act, because,
if you were to do so, you needn’t have been in the same choice situation
as the one you face in the actual world. If you were to perform b, then b
the Principle of Alternative Invariance: whether an act is one of the (relevant) alternatives
in a choice situation does not depend on which of the performable acts in the situation
are performed; see Gustafsson 2014, 590. Plausibly, whether an act is an alternative in a
situation supervenes on what acts are performable in that situation.
20 If we allow that the performability of acts in a choice situation might depend on
what acts are performed in the situation, we could have cases where Objective Act
Consequentialism and the Principle of Satisfiability conflict without any counterfactual
instability in the outcomes of acts. Consider a situation where only acts a and b are
performable; b has a better outcome than a; but, if b were performed, a further act c
would be performable and the outcome of c would be better than each of the outcomes
of a and b.
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would be wrong in the choice situation in which it would be performed.
Hence the amended principle fails to capture the basic idea behind the
Principle of Satisfiability. To capture the idea more fully, however, we
need a stronger principle that also rules out that one could only perform
an act that would be right act by jointly performing a wrong act:
The Principle of Strong Satisfiability
In every possible choice situation where the number of performable
acts is finite, there is at least one performable act x such that, if x
were performed, then, in the situation in which x would be per-
formed, no performed act would be wrong.
The Principle of Strong Satisfiability is stronger than the Principle of
Satisfiability. Therefore, since Objective Act Consequentialism violates
the latter, it violates the former too.21
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